











































A great deal has been written on the subject of women in twentieth-century Iran, froma variety of approaches and perspectives. Many of these works treat the issue ofwomen’s rights either referentially or directly. These studies generally provide an ac-
count of women’s rights in prerevolutionary Iran as background, often contrasting the lack of
activism in the 1960s and 1970s with women’smass participation in the Anti-Shah Revolution1
or with the burgeoning of activism after the establishment of the Islamic Republic.2 Studies
focusing on the broader historical frame of the twentieth century often have little to say about
the two decades preceding the Anti-Shah Revolution.3 In both types of studies, women’s rights
are often thought of as direct results of state modernization policies, bestowed from above as
royal grants, precluding any discussion of activism.
Paradoxically, scholars who write in opposition to the Pahlavi state, as well as those who
write supportively of it, share this view. Royalist narratives uncritically dismiss or omit women’s
activism when it occurs outside the purview of state activities.4 The notion of women’s rights
as royal grants is premised on a concept of the state as the institutional manifestation of the
monarch, with all state laws and policies occurring through the shah’s agency. The shah is
seen to act for the good of the people, helping the enlightened realize their goals and helping
those too traditional to know what is best for them, sometimes with a firm hand.5 Thus women
working within the state are acknowledged, but only as instruments of state policy.
This article is drawn from my master’s thesis, which benefited
from the comments of many insightful readers. My thanks to
Andrew Davison, Mehdi Khorrami, Farbod Mirfakhrai, Afsaneh
Najmabadi, Andrew Ralston, and A. Seth Young. Any errors, of
course, are mine.
1. I refer to the Iranian revolution of 1978–79 as Anti-Shah be-
cause the common goal of mass participation was dethroning
the shah rather than establishing an Islamic government.
2. See, for example, Azar Tabari and Nahid Yeganeh, eds., In the
Shadow of Islam: TheWomen’s Movement in Iran (London: Zed,
1982); Guity Nashat, ed., Women and Revolution in Iran (Boul-
der, CO: Westview, 1983); Haideh Moghissi, Populism and Femi-
nism in Iran: Women’s Struggle in a Male-Defined Revolution-
ary Movement (New York: St. Martin’s, 1994).
3. See, for example, Eliz Sanasarian, The Women’s Rights Move-
ment in Iran: Mutiny, Appeasement, and Repression from 1900
to Khomeini (New York: Praeger, 1982); Parvin Paidar, Women
and the Political Process in Twentieth-Century Iran (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1995); Janet Afary, “Steering be-
tween Scylla and Charybdis: Shifting Gender Roles in Twentieth
Century Iran,” NWSA Journal 8 (1996): 28–49.
4. See, for example, Ashraf Pahlavi, Faces in a Mirror: Memoirs
from Exile (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1980).
5. See, for example, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, Answer to His-
tory, trans.Michael Joseph (NewYork: Stein andDay, 1980); Badr
ol-Moluk Bamdad, From Darkness into Light: Women’s Emanci-
pation in Iran, trans. F. R. C. Bagley (Hicksville, NY: Exposition,
1977); George Lenczowski, “Political Process and Institutions in
Iran: The Second Pahlavi Kingship,” in Iran under the Pahlavis,
ed. George Lenczowski (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press,




















In response to royalist narratives that ei-
ther discredit or appropriate activism outside
the state, oppositional scholarship ends up un-
critically dismissing or omitting women’s activ-
ism when it cooperates with or works through
the state. A line is drawn between institution-
ally independent activism and activism through
the state, and the former is lauded at the ex-
pense of the latter. While this can constitute a
means of resistance to royalist narratives, the
result is that oppositional scholarship unwit-
tingly participates in the same erasure of agency
of women’s rights activists, except this erasure
is directed toward activists working within the
state.
Both writings assume the total domi-
nance, absolute power, and uniformity of the
Pahlavi state, leaving little room for locating re-
sistance and agency from within it. This notion
of the Pahlavi state is premised on a direct and
unquestioned correlation of institutional inde-
pendence with ideological independence. Such
a linkage is problematic, given the porous na-
ture of ideological domination and the flimsy
protection provided by institutional separation.
Institutional independence from the state cre-
ates a difference of position, which does not
necessarily afford ideological immunity. To
achieve its goals, any organization or movement
that does not seek to replace the state must en-
gage with the state institutionally and ideologi-
cally. This is especially true in a nondemocratic
political structure.
But if the state is a manifestation of the
shah and has a monopoly on power, then how
do we explain legal rights that women gained
under a misogynist shah?6 How do we explain
the care with which state modernization poli-
cies were discursively framed in accordance
with Islamic precepts? The state’s moderniza-
tion discourse and policy occurred in a field of
discursive forces, not a vacuum, and these dia-
logues of relation created boundaries and limits
on the power and language of each discourse.
While women’s rights activism may have
become circumscribed by state institutional
control, the state was also required to absorb ac-
tivists’ demands. This poses the question of how
to understand feminism within a context where
political restrictions do not necessarily allow for
formal women’s organizations separate from
the state. “The difficulty of discussing Third-
World feminism arises in the first instance as
a difficulty of identifying the concretions and
forms of effectivity in the Third World that can
be grasped as feminist.”7 Instead of dismissing
women’s organizations once they engage with
the state, I examine the results of that associa-
tion. I focus on understanding women’s rights
in the Pahlavi era as the result of a power ne-
gotiation between different forces, creating a
more porous view of the state. Specifically, I
ask how the state’s discourses of moderniza-
tion and development interacted with, framed,
and affected the feminist discourse of women’s
rights.8 In what way did women’s rights activists
who chose to work within the state use modern-
ization discourse to achieve their goals?
The evolution of women’s organizations
and their activities culminating in the creation
of the Women’s Organization of Iran (WOI)
and the narratives of various state-affiliated
women’s rights activists are my primary focal
points. I suggest that feminist activism under-
taken within state institutions cannot be dis-
missed as a direct extension of state policies.
This activism needs to be examined in a way
that allows us to locate agency and resistance to
state dominance, as well as the results of such
dominance. Analyzing the question of women’s
rights as a complex relationship defined by
power negotiation is critical to reassessing the




In oppositional scholarship, a major assump-
tion in evaluations of women’s rights activism
6. For the shah’s views on women, see Oriana Fallaci,
“Muhammad Reza Pahlavi,” in Interview with His-
tory, trans. John Shepley (New York: Liveright, 1976),
264–72; and R. K. Karanjia, The Mind of a Monarch
(London: Allen, 1977), 178–87.
7. Geraldine Heng, “ ‘A Great Way to Fly’: Nation-
alism, the State, and the Varieties of Third-World
Feminism,” in Feminist Genealogies, Colonial Lega-
cies, Democratic Futures, ed. M. Jaqui Alexander and
Chandra Talpade Mohanty (New York: Routledge,
1997), 30.
8. Development refers to state policies geared toward
developing industrial capitalism in Iran. Moderniza-
tion refers to the state’s social policies designed to




















2 2 9in Pahlavi Iran is that only activities and or-
ganizations independent of the state are con-
sidered feminist or as constituting a women’s
movement.9 A notion of autonomy is the an-
alytic pivot of this assumption. Political cri-
tiques of the Pahlavi state often reflect a desire
for democratic rights and institutions. Many of
these critiques point to nearly nonexistent av-
enues for feminist activism other than through
the state or through guerrilla movements.10
One symptom of this critique is the inclusion
into history of the activism that the state dis-
misses, the activism occurring outside the state.
These analyses adopt rigid notions of what
constitutes the boundaries of the state. Thus
agency is recognized according to a polarized
dichotomy of domains: inside and outside the
state. Although this is not the goal of the cri-
tique, the process of writing activists outside the
state back into history often results in activists
within the state being concomitantly stripped
of agency. The following literature review is not
meant to be comprehensive or to claim that all
scholarship on women’s rights in Iran falls prey
to these dangers. My intention is to provide a
sketch of a general tendency in order to con-
textualize the conceptual concerns explored in
this article. A notion of autonomy creates a dis-
tinguishing line between activists as agents and
activists as government tools. Ignored is the pos-
sibility that “the response of a Third-World fem-
inism under threat must be, and has sometimes
been, to assume the nationalist mantle itself.”11
I do not dispute the significance of institutional
freedom; however, I would like to point out
some dangers of this kind of analysis.
Eliz Sanasarian’s The Women’s Rights Move-
ment in Iran: Mutiny, Appeasement, and Repres-
sion from 1900 to Khomeini is one of the first
book-length works written on women’s rights in
Iran and serves as a secondary source for many
scholars. The work spans women’s rights ac-
tivism in the twentieth century up through the
establishment of the Islamic Republic. Sanasar-
ian’s primary concern is identifying activism as a
social movement according to characterizations
of social movements theoretically formulated in
the context of an idealized North America.12
Her analysis traces the women’s movement
through a unilinear trajectory of origin, rise, de-
cline, and extinction. In her optic, the Constitu-
tional Revolution of 1905 marks the origins of
women’s activism. The rise of this activism into
a movement ends with the dismantling of the
Patriotic Women’s League in 1932. Sanasarian
makes the startling assertion that “the disband-
ing of the last independent women’s organiza-
tion in 1932 marked the end of the women’s
movement in Iran.”13 This assertion is partly
linked to her theoretical framework, which con-
tends that a social movement must be in op-
position to an official establishment.14 There
is a direct and uncritical correlation here be-
tween a movement and institutional indepen-
dence. Can we really assume that the same ac-
tivists Sanasarian vests with agency when outside
the state lost that agency simply on account of
entering the state? At the very least, this possi-
bility merits exploration rather than dismissal.
Many scholars view the central govern-
ment as weak during 1941–53 and concentrate
on the emergence of numerous political par-
ties and organizations. While it is generally ac-
knowledged that this context allowed for the
“independent” activity of many women’s rights
activists, scholars note the failure of national-
ist political parties to produce any significant
changes in the legal position of women. This
failure is attributed to the auxiliary position
of many women’s organizations in relation to
male-run political parties.
9. For a notable exception to the tendency to strip ac-
tivists of agency once they work through the state,
see Afsaneh Najmabadi, “(Un)Veiling Feminism,” So-
cial Text, no. 18 (2000): 29–45.
10. Sima Bahar acknowledges women’s rights ac-
tivists who “had been struggling for over fifty years.”
However, this definition of activism does not seem to
include activists working within the state, since the
1953 coup d’e´tat resulted in an end “to the political
activities of women,” only to be rekindled “with the
beginning of the Siahkal Movement.” She dismisses
the activities of the High Council of Women, claim-
ing that it was “fully controlled by the regime.” Thus
the only activists with any legitimacy or agency in
her analysis are women involved in the guerrilla
movement (“A Historical Background to theWomen’s
Movement in Iran,” in Women of Iran: The Conflict
with Fundamentalist Islam, ed. Farah Azari [London:
Ithaca, 1983], 181–82).
11. Heng, “Great Way to Fly,” 34.
12. Sanasarian,Women’s Rights Movement in Iran, 4.
This context seems to presuppose a political atmo-
sphere that allows for civil society independent of the
state.
13. Ibid., 28.
14. For instance, she states that this established op-
ponent “could be a government, a specific group
in society, or an institution,” but that social move-
ments “work against the general stream of things”




















Janet Afary’s discussion of the 1941–53
period is characterized by an understanding of
women’s activism as institutionally subjugated
to the broader political agendas of political par-
ties, which privileged nationalist ideas over what
were seen as special interests, such as female
suffrage. This understanding of the ideologi-
cal subordination of women’s rights to national-
ist issues makes the same uncritical correlation
between ideological subservience and institu-
tional subservience as does Sanasarian. “Even
one of the most outspoken women’s organiza-
tions,” because it was a separate, auxiliary wing
of a larger political party with nationalist goals,
“placed greater priority on nationalist and gen-
eral political demands than on the issue of
women’s rights.”15 Again we are presented with
the idea of a reified masculine political force,
this time a political party instead of a king, im-
pervious to any kind of influence from below or
within. According to Afary, the agency of out-
spoken activists is replaced by the agency of this
dominatingmasculine force. We are left with lit-
tle room to understand how the negotiation of
power in this period resulted in almost no legal
changes for women.
Scholars generally describe the post-1953
period as a time when the monarchy asserted
its hegemony over state power by eradicating
all opposition. Most women’s rights activism
was seen as centered on the campaign to gain
the right to vote and run for office. After this
right was gained and the WOI formed several
years later, the Family Protection Law, com-
monly viewed as a product of the state, was
passed. The process by which these laws came
into being, rather than the laws themselves, are
my primary concern.16
Parvin Paidar’s work strongly establishes
the centrality of women’s position within the po-
litical discourses of twentieth-century Iran, but
there is little explanation of how the Pahlavi
state came to include women’s rights in its
modernization agenda. We are simply told that
“the discourse of modernity aimed to bring
the familial and social position of women in
line with the image of a great-civilization-in-the-
making.”17 Regarding the right to vote, Paidar
states that female suffrage was granted “by the
arbitrary action of an autocratic ruler.”18 We are
left with the impression that Muhammad Reza
Pahlavi woke up one morning in a good mood
and decided to allow women to vote.
Paidar allots only eleven out of nearly
four hundred pages to discussion of the shah’s
gender rhetoric, the WOI, and the family laws
passed in the 1960s and 1970s. To the WOI
itself, she devotes two paragraphs, with a few
further mentions in relation to laws or inter-
changeably with the state. By 1966 officially
recognized women’s organizations were struc-
turally linked to the Pahlavi state through
the WOI,19 but this fact should not consti-
tute a wholesale dismissal of all of its activities.
Paidar’s definition of the state is confusing, vac-
illating between laws, the shah’s rhetoric, and
the actions of individual institutions without dis-
tinction (149–60).
The family laws of the 1960s and 1970s
were the flagship of the state’s modernization
policy. Despite the state’s pretense that these
laws were aimed at liberating women and revo-
lutionizing their position, there were other mo-
tives behind them, such as population control,
and they had amuchmore limited aim than was
pretended (155).
There is no examination of the process by
which these laws were conceived, formulated,
or negotiated through the state apparatus, nor
is there any distinction among the different ac-
tors involved within the state. Paidar mentions a
newspaper article critiquing theMajlis’s (parlia-
ment’s) failure to reform family laws. She then
jumps several years to when the New Iran Party
15. Afary, “Steering between Scylla and Charyb-
dis,” 36.
16. See F. R. C. Bagley, “The Iranian Family Protec-
tion Law of 1967: A Milestone in the Advance of
Women’s Rights,” in Iran and Islam: In Memory of
the Late Vladimir Minorsky, ed. C. E. Bosworth (Ed-
inburgh: University of Edinburgh Press, 1971), 47–64;
Behnaz Pakizegi, “Legal and Social Positions of Iranian
Women,”Women in the Muslim World, ed. Lois Beck
and Nikki Keddie (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univer-
sity Press, 1978), 216–26; Sanasarian,Women’s Rights
Movement in Iran, 94–97; Gholam-Reza Vatandoust,
“The Status of Iranian Women during the Pahlavi
Regime,” Women and the Family in Iran, ed. Asghar
Fathi (Leiden: Brill, 1985), 114–21.
17. Parvin Paidar, Women and the Political Process in
Twentieth-Century Iran (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 1995), 356.
18. Ibid., 146.
19. Anthony Parsons calls the WOI and similar or-
ganizations “quasi-independent para-statal organi-
zations,” since they were linked to the state by some
member of the royal family, and government minis-
ters often held positions on the planning committees
(Anthony Parsons, The Pride and Fall: Iran 1974-1979



















2 3 1presented a bill to the Majlis that was passed
into law. All we are told is that “the bill was co-
drafted by the WOI and became known as the
Family Protection Law.” The agency of activists
working within the Majlis is erased and trans-
ferred to their political party, and we are left
with the impression that the role of theWOI was
akin to that of a secretary (153).
Paidar describes the WOI as a “closed,
hierarchical, and non-democratic institution”
that “suffered from decay and corruption in-
herent in such institutions.” While “such institu-
tions” is never explicitly defined, we are left to
deduce that she is referring to government insti-
tutions, since she qualifies her assessment with
an equally vague assertion that “the WOI played
an important role in promoting positive policies
on women within the state machinery.”20 This
last statement is the extent to which the topic is
treated. The cursory attention afforded to the
WOI allows neither for the agency of activists
within the organization nor for the possibility
of resistance to the state from within the organi-
zation.
Eliz Sanasarian calls the period 1953–66
one of centralization and co-optation of the
women’s movement by the state, which sought
to bring women’s independent activities under
control. There is no room in Sanasarian’s
analysis to question the level of this control.21
Although shementions activists’ efforts to lobby
for legal changes in family laws, she is deeply
critical of the fact that they “could only act in
accordance with the government to bring about
legal changes in women’s rights” (89–90). This
lack of institutional autonomy is reason enough
to dismiss the agency of activists and the need
for a closer look at their process of negotiation
with the state. We are merely told that the WOI
“did not make demands that could or would not
be met; their activities were quite compatible
with the government’s stand” (79). She dis-
misses theWOI as a social movement because of
this perceived accommodation and subsequent
limitations imposed on its priorities and goals.
In Afary’s analysis, the first we hear of a
women’s organization is the formation of the
WOI. “In 1966 Muhammad Reza Shah ap-
proved the formation of the Women’s Organi-
zation of Iran (WOI), a new umbrella organiza-
tion whose president was the Shah’s ambitious
twin sister Princess Ashraf.”22 We are given the
impression that the creation of the WOI was
the shah’s idea and that Ashraf Pahlavi jumped
at the chance to head this wholly new institu-
tion. There are serious problems with this ex-
planation, not the least of which is that a whole
history of feminist activism and organization is
omitted along with the effects of that activity on
the structure and direction of the WOI.
Although the post-1953 period resulted in
the consolidation of the shah’s political power
through repression of various political parties
and independent organizations, Guity Nashat
argues that “it did not destroy the aspiration
of many women who had been active in or had
supported the campaign for women’s rights.”23
Nashat’s article is important because it acknowl-
edges the role that activism played in the state’s
passage of laws. While the right to vote would
not have become law without the support of
the shah, we cannot overlook that “the cease-
less campaign of many of the older women and
younger recruits—hundreds of women profes-
sionals, teachers, and students—was instrumen-
tal in having suffrage for women included as
one of the six points of the White Revolution.”
Not only does Nashat acknowledge the work
of activists for women’s rights, she also poses a
challenge to the notion that all women’s rights
were bestowed from above, directly from the
hand of the shah: “Later, the regime of the shah
tried to claim all the credit for the extension
of the right to vote to women.”24 Nashat’s argu-
ment recognizes the lack of many political free-
doms, but her notion of activism is not depen-
dent on institutional autonomy.
20. To her credit, Paidar does try to acknowledge a dif-
ference between the shah and the activistswithin the
WOI, but this statement does not restore any agency
to activists, and she does not explore the notion any
further, leaving us with the impression of helpless
activists, penned within the shah’s policies (Paidar,
Women and the Political Process, 150).
21. Sanasarian, Women’s Rights Movement in Iran,
81–82.
22. Afary, “Steering between Scylla and Charyb-
dis,” 38.
23. Guity Nashat, “Women in Pre-Revolutionary Iran:
A Historical Overview,” in Nashat, Women and Revo-





















When institutional autonomy is not pos-
sible, can we say that feminist activism disap-
pears? As Geraldine Heng points out, “Third-
World feminism, by virtue of its vexed historical
origins and complicated negotiations with con-
temporary state apparatuses, is necessarily a
chimerical, hydra-headed creature, surviving
in a plethora of lives and guises.”25 Although
Sanasarian asserts that many social movements
“change form, adapting to varying sociopoliti-
cal conditions,” she is unable to view state in-
stitutional control as one of these conditions.26
Unfortunately (though with several notable ex-
ceptions), many scholars uncritically draw on
Sanasarian’s work and demonstrate similar an-
alytic tendencies, attesting to how the erasure
of activists’ agency within state structures con-
tinues to be reproduced.
An AlternateWay to Frame
Women’s Rights Activism
According to Sanasarian, centralization of
women’s organizations during the reign of
Muhammad Reza Pahlavi began in 1956, when
the minister of labor encouraged a mass meet-
ing of women planned by the heads of several
different women’s groups. The outcome of this
meeting was the formation of the Federation
of Women’s Organizations (the Federation)
in 1959, which consisted of fourteen orga-
nizations. Sanasarian places Ashraf Pahlavi’s
direct control of this organization in 1961,
when the Federation became the High Council
consisting of eighteen women’s associations.
Sanasarian contends that “except for following
the formalities of building a bureaucratic
type organization, the High Council did not
do anything else” (80–81). Viewed through
Sanasarian’s historical narrative, women’s
rights groups were passively absorbed into an
aggressive state whose main intention was to
restrict the demands of civil organizations.
Activists within these organizations are assigned
a total lack of agency, both in the process of
institutional centralization and in terms of their
work within these organizations.
Although the class composition of ear-
lier women’s organizations was predominantly
urban upper- and middle-class, Sanasarian ad-
mires their work. She concludes that activists’
lack of personal qualities such as “imagina-
tion, courage and egalitarian idealism” in com-
parison to their counterparts in the 1920s, as
well as their “subservience to the state . . . made
them concentrate on purely legal changes for
women” (81). This supposed sole focus on le-
gal changes, which benefited only their classes,
seems to be the main justification for dismissal
of activists in the 1960s and 1970s. Sanasar-
ian attributes differences in activism to the lack
of personal qualities. This view implies that
the opposition of earlier feminists vis-a`-vis the
state reflects these qualities, while a position
of cooperation and activism from within the
state does not. And it is by virtue of this differ-
ence that latter-day activists treated lower-class
women, who were not represented in their or-
ganizations, as “mere objects of charity” (81).
Although Sanasarian does not explain this dis-
tinction any further, it is a crucial one that I take
up later.
An alternate way to understand the dif-
ference between activists who occupy different
points in history is to treat them as subjects ac-
tively engaged with their respective times. As
Joan Scott puts it, “The creation of women
as subjects of history places them temporally
in the context of their action, and explains
the possibilities for such action in terms of
those contexts.”27 This point is crucial to keep
in mind when examining the metamorphosis
of women’s organizations alongside their ideo-
logical negotiations with the state. Mrinalini
Sinha asks the critical question, “Do the ideo-
logical constructs that condition women’s par-
ticipation predetermine the nature of women’s
responses and make any interrogation of the
consciousness and agency of women themselves
irrelevant?”28 We can learn more about the
nature of these ideological constructs them-
selves and the terms of institutional participa-
tion that are negotiated within them. I exam-
ine the narratives of activists involved with these
25. Heng, “Great Way to Fly,” 30.
26. Sanasarian,Women’s Rights Movement in Iran, 1.
27. Joan Wallach Scott, “Introduction: Feminism and
History,” in Feminism and History, ed. Joan Wallach
Scott (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 4.
28. Mrinalini Sinha, “Gender in the Critiques of
Colonialism and Nationalism: Locating the Indian



















2 3 3organizations, as well as the context that their
activities shaped and that shaped their activities.
I take up these narratives as fragments, not as
historical evidence per se but “as the articula-
tion of another subject position arising from a
certain experience.”29
This may seem an overly optimistic pur-
suit, and as Partha Chatterjee has pointed out,
we must not underestimate “the powers of a
hegemonizing nationalism to take in its stride
a whole range of dissenting voices.”30 The ide-
ological dissonance resulting from activists’ ne-
gotiations with the state’s discourse of national-
ism indicates that, rather than a hegemonizing
nationalism, it is a dominant nationalism. This
difference allows for more distinct existences of
other discourses and places the dominant dis-
course in a position more vulnerable to change.
For the dominant discourse to absorb dissent-
ing voices, it must make adjustments to accom-
modate that absorption, adjustments that ul-
timately affect its nature. These adjustments,
while enabling domination, also provide the
possibility of a discursive grammar of resistance.
Chatterjee suggests a way to think about this re-
lation between a dominant discourse absorbing
critique and the subsequent mutual transforma-
tion that takes place:
We cannot find a historically nuanced answer to
this question unless we think of the field of dis-
courses as one of contention, peopled by several
subjects, several consciousnesses. We must think
of discourse as situated within fields of power,
not only constituting that field, but also consti-
tuted by it. Dominance here cannot exhaust the
claims to subjectivity, for even the dominated
must always retain an aspect of autonomy. Oth-
erwise, power would cease to be a relation; it
would no longer be constituted by struggle.31
Dominance is not a position independent of
power relations. The state’s discourse of mod-
ernization provided limits and restrictions
through which the women’s rights discourse
had to voice its demands. The ideological and
structural domination that the Pahlavi state ex-
erted over women’s rights discourse created
a relationship that ultimately enabled subtle
changes in the state’s discourse of moderniza-
tion.
Activists’ demands, however, compro-
mised their terms and nature, and, maybe be-
cause of their accommodating language, forced
the state to address and enact laws that it per-
haps would not have without this pressure. The
state is obliged to accommodate demands in
some way, since the state defines and is be-
holden to its own method of control. Although
the state has set up the system of control, it
too operates, is restricted, and defined by that
same ordering principle of control. Further-
more, it is through this relationship and its re-
strictions that we can read other relations of
restriction, created through domination, which
surrounded and gave shape to the Pahlavi state.
Reflections on the Institutional Evolution
ofWomen’s Organizations
The New Path Society (Jama’at-i Rah-i Naw) was
an independent organization founded in 1954
that eventually became part of the High Coun-
cil and then the WOI. Mehrangiz Dolatshahi
and a group of her coworkers at the National
Development Agency founded the New Path.32
Its membership “was of all types,” including
a variety of women belonging to other occu-
pationally—and religiously—defined organiza-
tions, as well as some men. “It was more broad
based [than other organizations] and more
specifically, its primary goal was women’s
rights.”33 While we can safely say that the New
Path Society was not a national mass move-
ment, it seems to have been a fairly important
29. Gyanendra Pandey, “In Defense of the Fragment:
Writing about Hindu-Muslim Riots in India Today,”
Representations 37 (1992): 47.
30. Although Chatterjee is discussing a hegemonic
discourse, I find many of his examples also apply
to dominant discourses (Partha Chatterjee, The Na-
tion and Its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial
Histories [Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
1993], 151).
31. Ibid., 137.
32. The National Development Agency was created
under the joint auspices of the Iranian government
and the American-sponsored Point Four program.
Dolatshahi describes how the Point Four program
helpedmake educated upper- andmiddle-classwom-
en’s employment in offices more acceptable (Meh-
rangiz Dolatshahi, interview by Shahrokh Meskoob,
15 May 1984, Paris, tape 3, pages 15–16, Iranian Oral
History Collection, Harvard University; translations
mine).




















organization among affluent women in Tehran.
Although engaged in social work, the main fo-
cus of the organization was the political rights
of women.
Dolatshahi provides two reasons in hind-
sight why an organization primarily concerned
with women’s rights became involved in so-
cial work: “Because our society had need for
it and because the ladies in the organization
needed to keep busy and have activities to en-
gage in.” According to Dolatshahi, the signifi-
cance of these activities was twofold: “One was
so that these women could gain some confi-
dence in themselves and recognize that they
can do things. Women had been in their homes
for so long and they think they are only [suited]
for housework and at first they don’t have the
nerve for activity outside of the house. And
the other reason is for society to see that these
ladies can be effective and get things done.”34
Put another way, middle-class activists empow-
ered themselves by providing social services for
lower-class women so that they could then ap-
proach male officials within the state to push
for legal changes. The acquisition of political
standing through social work is a relation with
enormous class implications, which I take up
later.
The New Path’s primary point of emphasis was
family law, above the right to vote, because if we
have the right to vote, many will not pay atten-
tion [tavajjuh] to it. And women don’t vote and
if they do they cast a vote but don’t really partic-
ipate the way that they should. But if family laws
are fixed any person, whether they are aware or
unaware [of family law] is included and will uti-
lize it [family law].35
This statement challenges the claim that
the primary goal of feminist activism during the
1950s and early 1960s was to gain the right
to vote. The justification provided for this pri-
oritization of family laws above suffrage dem-
onstrates a lack of faith in women’s political
awareness or ability to “correctly” participate
politically. Reform of family laws is deemed
more “useful,” since marriage is considered the
reality of all women and does not require the
modern consciousness necessary to claim this
right. The focus on family laws is an attempt to
push for change on an issue that will improve
women’s rights, since a woman does not have to
be aware of the right to benefit from it. What is
hinted at is the passivity of some women, which
is in marked contrast to the subject position
from which Dolatshahi herself speaks. This is a
relation of service based on difference, of active
women defining and representing the interests
of the majority, based on a perception of this
majority as passive beings.
Within the New Path, the representative
structure was one of inclusive decision mak-
ing and democratic participation. While dif-
ferent commissions reported once a week to
the board of directors, monthly meetings were
held to give all members the opportunity to
hear the progress of various commissions, to
express opinions and suggestions, and to get
new information regarding rights. The compo-
sition of commissions was based on voluntary
participation.36 A number of these meetings fo-
cused on understanding and discussing the con-
stitution (qanun-i asasi) or the civil code (qanun-
i madan-i), especially pertaining to the family,
women, and children. The New Path’s strategy
was to raise the awareness of educated women
of the upper classes about existing rights and
to engage in debates about how these rights
needed to be changed. Powerful government
officials, judges, and lawyers were invited to
these debates.37 Dolatshahi states that they “did
not exaggerate, we didn’t try to instigate people
to rise up and yell.” Their strategy was not a rad-
ical one of violence or agitation, it was a more
cooperative approach toward enacting change;
they chose to raise awareness and create forums
for discussion: “We would say that these men
that we now live with did not create these cir-
cumstances. This state of affairs is centuries old.
But we must, through discussion and negotia-
tion and debate, try to convince these men and
to make them aware of how bad these laws are
until they are fixed.”38
34. Dolatshahi, tape 3, 17.
35. Dolatshahi, tape 3, 19.
36. Dolatshahi, tape 3, 17–18.
37. Dolatshahi, tape 3, 20.



















2 3 5This is a conciliatory and nonconfron-
tational approach, which espouses changing
laws through discussion and raising awareness.
While this approach may seem far from radical,
and consciously supportive of the state, it is nev-
ertheless lobbying for change from within the
system.39 Pro-establishment does notmean pro–
status quo in terms of the laws of that establish-
ment. Therefore, while Dolatshahi cooperated
with the state in terms of working through it, she
resisted the status quo and attempted to enact
change through legal means. While there are
drawbacks to this approach, this does not con-
stitute a lack of activism.
The first sign of centralization of women’s
organizations comes with the establishment
of the Federation of Women’s Organizations.
Dolatshahi recalls that the activists in various
organizations decided to organize themselves.
“Because naturally it was necessary for the dif-
ferent women’s societies to cooperate with each
other and for each group not to just go their
own way. As a result, in 1956, about a year after
the New Path Society was established, a number
of women’s societies gathered together. First we
were 14 societies and we began to think about
creating a cooperative organization, a federa-
tion out of the different societies.”40 Part of ac-
knowledging the agency of women’s rights ac-
tivists is to recognize their participation and
agency in creating their institutional relation to
the state. The nature of this cooperation was
one of coordination of activities and resources
according to the orientation of each organiza-
tion. For instance, some organizations engaged
only in social and charity work and did not
lobby for political rights. Others, like the New
Path, engaged in both types of work and coor-
dinated social-work activities with organizations
that did not engage in political activities. The
different organizations each sent one represen-
tative to the Federation to act as a liaison be-
tween their organization and the Federation’s
elected board of directors.41
One society belonging to the Federation,
the Seventeenth of Day Society,42 asked Ashraf
Pahlavi to be their honorary president (ra’is-
i ‘ali). Dolatshahi describes this society as one
that “was not very serious.” Pahlavi’s acceptance
of the position sparked debates on autonomy
and organization within the Federation. “We
discussed whether or not this act was right be-
cause this act had good and bad aspects. The
majority were of the opinion that we needed to
stand on our own feet and if individuals from
the royal family wanted to recognize us, they
could help us or we could ask them for help,
but as a rule, the Federation of Women’s Or-
ganizations had not asked anyone to be the
president.”43
Institutional autonomy was a hotly con-
tested issue. Although it was a means of inde-
pendence from government control, that con-
trol could provide women’s organizations with
funding, as well as official support for their
projects.44 Uproar among the women’s organi-
zations caused individual activists to take the
matter to the state. According toDolatshahi, the
shah had decided that if his sister was to head
one organization in the Federation, she should
head all of them, supposedly to avoid charges of
favoritism. Dolatshahi attributes the shah’s de-
sire for control over women’s organizations to
the fear that they would be appropriated by dan-
gerous leftist movements.45 Activists within the
different organizations weighed their options
and decided to accept Ashraf Pahlavi’s leader-
ship. The choice was a consciously pragmatic
one, where a degree of control was exchanged
for the promise of increased effectivity in their
work. But the continually fluctuating degree of
control was to result in a relationship, both in-
stitutionally and ideologically, that warrants at-
tention.
39. Although such an approach may not seem radical
from a present-day feminist perspective, by her own
account Dolatshahi was viewed as a radical by her
well-educated uncle, who was a judge (Dolatshahi,
tape 3, 19).
40. Mehrangiz Dolatshahi, interview by Shahrokh
Meskoob, 15 May 1984, Paris, tape no. 4, Iranian Oral
History Collection, Harvard University, 13.
41. Dolatshahi, tape 4, 14.
42. Day is an Iranian month roughly corresponding
to 22 December–19 January. The Seventeenth of Day
is the date that Reza Shah ordered women to un-
veil. Later, it became a day of celebration for various
women’s organizations.
43. Dolatshahi, tape 4, 15.
44. “Now this is a problematic aspect and one that I
think the Federation got to thinking that should they
put Princess Ashraf, who was a smart and capable
person, as the head of the women’s organizations
on one hand she could help and on the other hand
she could have [the organizations] under her control”
(Dolatshahi, tape 4, 15).




















The new institution created under the
honorary presidency of Ashraf Pahlavi and with
the active participation of the Federation was
the High Council. The organization’s activities
were more centralized and subject to Pahlavi’s
control, but the High Council’s domestic activ-
ities were not significantly different from the
Federation’s. This was not the case on the inter-
national front. “One of the orders that the shah
gave to Princess Ashraf was to control the or-
ganization’s international activities so that just
anyone would not be permitted to go to any
conference.” Dolatshahi describes how before
the High Council, any persons involved with
these organizations with enough money to pay
their way could go to international women’s
conferences, regardless of their qualifications.
After the High Council was established, it sent
and paid for the most qualified representatives
to attend international conferences, a change
Dolatshahi considered a positive aspect of state
control.46
The High Council’s participation in inter-
nationally sponsored activities was sometimes
used as a leverage point against the state. At
times when the state did not choose to send
High Council activists to international events,
the positions of activists within these interna-
tional organizations could be used to gain rep-
resentation despite this exclusion. “Without the
support of Princess Ashraf and the High Coun-
cil in sending me to all of the meetings of
the International Council of Women, I would
never have reached a level in the International
Council to become elected its leader.”47 It would
have been profoundly embarrassing for the
state had it curtailed Dolatshahi’s attendance
from the International Council’s events. This
prestige and prominence on the international
scene also enhanced activists’ positions vis-a`-vis
the state. Dolatshahi recalls the importance of
the International Council’s support of a draft
of reformed family laws in consolidating the
High Council’s support of this draft. The High
Council then took this draft to the ministry of
justice, since there was no Majlis in session at
the time. While nothing immediately came of
the proposal, Dolatshahi describes this sort of
access to state institutions as novel; the draft be-
came the basis of what was eventually passed by
later activism within the Majlis.48 It was not un-
til some activists were elected to the Majlis that
reform of family laws was passed, yet the High
Council’s new state affiliation afforded activists
greater representation on the political scene,
domestically and internationally, even as it sub-
jected their activities to institutional control.
Although the High Council facilitated a
more unified, organized, and controlled pres-
ence within the state, as well as international
institutions, individual women’s organizations
still continued their various social, charitable,
and political activities at the local level. These
activities were subject to supervision and coor-
dination, but the existence of the High Coun-
cil did not alter the structure of these orga-
nizations, and, in many cases, it aided their
activities through increased cooperation with
each other and with relevant state organs. Dolat-
shahi ascribes these beneficial aspects of the
High Council to the power and support that
Ashraf Pahlavi garnered. It was at the encour-
agement of experienced activists that Ashraf
Pahlavi began to participate directly in inter-
national conferences. According to Dolatshahi,
while Pahlavi had decision-making power over
institutional matters and was a major liaison
with the state, the years of experience that lead-
ing activists had in running these organizations
were the basis for both domestic and interna-
tional activities.49 In other words, activists did
not become clones of Pahlavi. Rather, their co-
operation and compromise with her allowed
them to bring their own agendas to the table
to create an institution that was the result of an
active exchange of skills and experience, albeit
from a subordinate position of power.
Increased participation of international
activities brought activists into contact with
other women’s rights activists from all over the
46. Dolatshahi, tape 4, 16.
47. Dolatshahi, tape 4, 17.
48. Dolatshahi, tape 4, 17. See Dolatshahi, tape 7, 6–13,
for an account of how activists worked through the
Majlis to pass the Family Protection Law.
49. Dolatshahi describes how Pahlavi actively in-
cluded Dolatshahi, who had years of experience in
the international arena, in planning the High Coun-
cil’s involvement with international activities. Dolat-
shahi and other activists encouraged Pahlavi’s direct
participation in these activities. This participation
seemed limited to attending and speaking at the
opening of a conference. Aside from this, activists
were left to participate according to their own judg-



















2 3 7world. Dolatshahi conveys a sense of certain
norms and ideals that circulated within this in-
ternational forum, which became institutional
and policy goals for domestic organizations.
One ideal was that of mass participation, de-
noted by increased membership in women’s or-
ganizations. Dolatshahi describes this goal as
one of the primary reasons behind the creation
of the Women’s Organization of Iran in 1966, a
more centralized institution, which was to co-
ordinate increased membership and activities
through its virtual monopoly on women’s rights
activism in Iran.50 Activists discussed the matter
with Ashraf Pahlavi, advising caution and pa-
tience for the growth of civil institutions and
mass participation from below, rather than insti-
tutional cannibalism from above. They argued
that increased membership would result from
increased education, employment, and politi-
cal participation, rather than from institutional
changes that would swallow the membership
of other organizations.51 Although the WOI
served the state’s political and social agenda
more than that of women’s rights activists, ac-
tivists engaged with this institutional shift and
were conscious of its dangers.
Ashraf Pahlavi wanted to create a unified,
nationwide women’s organization to replace all
other women’s organizations to gain mass par-
ticipation (or the semblance of mass participa-
tion for international eyes) and increase insti-
tutional centralization (which she envisioned
as increased effectiveness). Paradoxically, the
same international ideals that inspired Pahlavi’s
idea of a national organization also constrained
the resulting form of the institution. If the WOI
replaced all other women’s organizations, it
would forfeit its membership with the Interna-
tional Council of Women, “because the terms
of membership of the International Council are
that member organizations act as an umbrella
to aid and coordinate different organizations,
in different fields, nation wide.”52 This stricture
was meant to encourage the growth of civil soci-
ety along a democratic trajectory, rather than to
aid the consolidation of civil organizations un-
der an autocratic state. As a result, the WOI re-
placed individual societies in the provinces with
WOI branches but allowed organizations oper-
ating in the capital to continue their activities
under the supervision of the WOI.53 As Dolat-
shahi notes, the WOI was no longer a federated
body constituted by and run by individual mem-
ber organizations; now “this women’s organiza-
tion was the rival of other women’s societies, but
it had greater political and financial power.”54
Even while activists opted to continue work-
ing for women’s rights in an environment of
ever narrowing institutional options, they were
aware and critical of the drawbacks of these in-
stitutional changes.
Although international considerations
had salvaged the existence of individual wom-
en’s organizations in Tehran, they were subject
to the supervision of a branch of the WOI
called Women’s Organization of the Capital
(Sazman-i Zanan-i Pay-i Takt). Dolatshahi is crit-
ical of this new chain of command, especially
because the head of the supervising WOI
branch “was not in favor of the existence of the
societies.” Since the head of these societies, who
acted as their liaison with the WOI, thought
them to be superfluous and unnecessary,
the organizations were further isolated and
constricted in their activities.55 Dolatshahi also
critiques the domestic activities of the WOI,
which had grand plans to provide services and
classes, organize conferences, and open many
branches with its sizeable budget and consider-
able resources.
But, in my opinion, these projects did not have
the depth that they should have. Sometimes,
and this was not something unique to the WOI,
it happened everywhere, some activities were
for show [namaayish-i]. For example, they would
have a seminar in some far flung province on
women with a lot of work and coming and go-
ing and the Princess going and afterwards you
would hear nothing about it and not know if the
seminar had yielded any results.56
Dolatshahi perceives a general level of
ineffectiveness in the WOI’s activities and its
50. Dolatshahi relates that Pahlavi’s visit to Poland’s
women’s organization, which claimed a membership
of three million, made an impression on Pahlavi by
virtue of her and the shah’s “enthusiasm for every-
thing to be big and grand” (Dolatshahi, tape 4, 21–22).
51. Dolatshahi, tape 4, 22.
52. Dolatshahi, tape 4, 23.
53. Dolatshahi, tape 4, 23.
54. Dolatshahi, tape 4, 25.
55. Dolatshahi, tape 4, 25–26.




















hampering of individual organizations, one of
which was the New Path. On the international
front she admits that the WOI did relatively
well in sending the same representatives to UN
conferences, although the WOI “were not or-
ganized enough” with other international or-
ganizations. They sent different representatives
each time, hampering the WOI’s effectiveness
by failing to send experienced representatives
or by preventing new representatives from gain-
ing experience. These criticisms are in marked
contrast to her appraisal of the High Council’s
perceived level of effectiveness. State affiliation
was beneficial so long as it did not severely stifle
or replace individual organizations. But the de-
gree of centralization and control achieved by
the WOI’s relation to the state is perceived as
counterproductive.57
Unequating Ashraf Pahlavi with
the Shah and the State
Ashraf Pahlavi’s position needs to be problema-
tized, since it is primarily according to percep-
tions of her power over women’s organizations
that most researchers dismiss or laud an orga-
nization. Many activists of the period working
within state-affiliated organizations defended
the integrity of these organizations by describ-
ing her role as cursory. Pahlavi is portrayed as a
figurehead, useful because she is able to lobby
the shah and to gain access to different facets of
the state on the organization’s behalf.58 Those
scholars who dismiss the WOI as a pawn of the
state view Pahlavi’s role as significant, as the link
through which the state (and more specifically
the shah) controlled the organization.59
However, it would be a mistake to under-
stand Ashraf Pahlavi as the female version of the
shah. Far from being the shah’s pawn, she was,
as Marvin Zonis describes her, “a formidable
player in Iranian politics.”60 Although Pahlavi
had a vested interest in the continuance of the
current regime, she sought both to support her
brother as well as to influence him according
to her own interests.61 The different accounts
of Pahlavi’s involvement and level of control re-
flect the ideological variations of activists work-
ing through state-affiliated institutions. Pahlavi,
in her own memoir, discredits prior women’s
movements and activism, locating the real burst
of women’s activism with her own entry into
the effort: “At the time I began my work for
women’s rights, we had a few scattered women’s
organizations, working at random, without any
long-range goals or purpose.”62 According to
Pahlavi, most of these women’s groups did vol-
untary charity work rather than engage with
any political or economic issues. A radically
different picture of the situation comes from
Mahnaz Afkhami, who served as the secretary-
general of the WOI from 1970 to 1979 and
as minister of women’s affairs from 1975 to
1979; Afkhami recognizes the agency of other
activists, including herself.63 Afkhami’s descrip-
tion of Pahlavi as a figurehead is in marked con-
trast to Pahlavi’s own description of her role as
instrumental in creating the High Council, and
later the WOI: “I met with representatives of
various organizations to create a framework for
our women’s movement.”64 With this statement,
Pahlavi not only places herself in a more central
and active role than that of simply providing the
meeting space but also dubs that meeting as the
beginning of the women’s movement. This is an
erasure of women’s activism before affiliation
with the state. Afkhami, on the other hand, sees
this particular meeting more as a change in the
form of the existing women’s movement, and
she does not participate in the same erasure of
prior women’s activism.
57. In a similar vein, Ozma Adl criticizes the profes-
sionalization of activists and what she perceives as
undue focus on legal changes (Ozma Adl [Naficy], in-
terview by Habib Ladjevardi, 10 February 1984, Cam-
bridge, tape 1, IranianOral History Collection, Harvard
University, 19–20).
58. For instance, see Mahnaz Afkhami, “Iran: A Future
in the Past—The ‘Prerevolutionary’ Women’s Move-
ment,” in Sisterhood Is Global: The International
Women’s Movement Anthology, ed. Robin Morgan
(Garden City, NY: Anchor, 1984), 331–33.
59. For instance, Sanasarian points to Ashraf Pahlavi’s
power to appoint the majority of the WOI’s Central
Council. For a more detailed discussion of the WOI’s
organizational structure, see Sanasarian, Women’s
Rights Movement in Iran, 83–85.
60. Marvin Zonis, Majestic Failure: The Fall of the
Shah (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 122.
61. Ibid., 126. For a description of Ashraf Pahlavi’s close
relationship with her brother and of her own au-
tonomous power, see also Adl, tape 2, 9–10.
62. Pahlavi, Faces in a Mirror, 154.
63. Afkhami, “Iran: A Future in the Past,” 337.



















2 3 9While this difference could easily be at-
tributed to Afkhami’s more autonomous po-
sition writing after the Anti-Shah Revolution,
her description of the evolution of women’s or-
ganizations and strategies reduces the impor-
tance of Pahlavi’s actual role and refocuses it
on how activists reconciled and implemented
a compromise with the state and its modern-
ization policies. This approach shows the de-
bate around this transformation, from which
we can locate activists’ participation in this pro-
cess of institutional transformation. The nature
of this active deliberation and decision mak-
ing is crucial to understanding the way activists
worked within the state and the resulting im-
pact on women’s rights, particularly for women
of different classes. Women’s rights activists who
adopted the nationalist construction of gen-
dered modernization “became active agents in
the nationalist project—complicit in the fram-
ing of its hegemonic strategies as much as they
were resistant to them because of their subordi-
nation under the new form of patriarchy.”65
TheModernization Bandwagon
Afkhami admits that the Pahlavi state, “al-
though by no means feminist in orientation,
at least was committed to modernization and
change.”66 For Afkhami, the necessity of cooper-
ation and compromise with an autocratic state
is a given. This commitment to modernization
and change is the lowest common denominator
between the state and women’s rights activism,
making cooperation possible. If the state could
include women’s rights as part of its moderniza-
tion projects, women’s rights could be framed
to make this incorporation possible. Compro-
mise is represented as a matter of practicality, a
way of procuring results. Thus, to garner state
support for women’s increased economic par-
ticipation, activism positioned women as cen-
tral to the nation’s economic development.
According to Afkhami, “Education in the broad-
est sense is the most important vehicle to bring
about change,” and “economic independence
is one of the first priorities and the basis for
achievement of other rights” (331). We see how,
theoretically at least, the feminist objectives of
women’s economic independence and higher
levels of education are presented in such a way
so as to appear harmonious with and integral
to the state’s development objective of an ex-
panded and more skilled labor force. “Thus,
special programs to combat illiteracy among ru-
ral women were not demanded solely on the
basis of women’s right to education, but as
a necessary means of modernization” (332).
The question remains, though, which aspects
of women’s rights were compromised by fram-
ing their increased economic participation in
nationalist terms?
Although Afkhami and Dolatshahi both
mention the necessity of political power for ac-
tivists to gain rights for women, there is little
mention of political participation of any kind
for the class of women that activists have taken
it upon themselves to represent. Article 1 of the
WOI’s constitution states that “the ultimate pur-
pose and the mission of the Women’s Organiza-
tion of Iran is to raise the cultural, social, and
economic knowledge of the women of Iran and
to make them aware of their family, social, and
economic rights, duties and responsibilities.”67
There is no mention of political awareness or
participation as a goal for Iranian women in
general, in contrast to the necessity of these
qualities for women’s rights activists themselves.
Furthermore, women’s rights are contingent
on duties and responsibilities. This presents a
trade-off: women’s rights are exchanged for the
responsibilities of modern citizenship and the
duty of participation in a capitalist economy.
Speaking fromWithin:
Women’s Rights andModernization
Institutional control meant that activists had to
work within the ideological constraints of the
state’s nationalist modernization policy. An ac-
tivist narrative written during the reign of the
last shah provides a better understanding of
what this compromise meant. The autonomy
enjoyed by both Afkhami and Dolatshahi in
their narratives is not present in this account
of the women’s rights movement by long-time
65. Chatterjee, Nation and Its Fragments, 148.
66. Afkhami, “Iran: A Future in the Past,” 331.
67. Women’s Organization of Iran, The Constitution





















activist Badr ol-Moluk Bamdad. While it is easy
to read Bamdad’s narrative as sycophantic, the
nuances of her narrative provide a glimpse
of the implications of the ideological compro-
mises that constitute her discourse of women’s
rights.68
Bamdad is primarily concerned with im-
pressing on the younger generation the enor-
mous transformation that has taken place in
women’s status through comparison with her
rendition of the past. The point here is not to
look for historical accuracy, but rather at the
way that Bamdad’s narrative constructs a spe-
cific picture of women’s activism in relation to
the state. She begins with an ahistorical, tradi-
tional woman whose complete oppression con-
tains few variations according to class or lo-
cale. Her narrative describes the Constitutional
Revolution as “Women’s Awakening” (25–54).
Activism, from this time until the 1930s, is
seen as a dangerous and uphill struggle under-
taken by courageous women in a time of dark-
ness (55–90). While she acknowledges the ac-
tivism of women before this time, she clearly
understands the creation of the state-sponsored
Ladies’ Center as the beginning of the women’s
movement. Bamdad expresses a sense of relief
at the state’s adoption of issues for which ac-
tivists had been pressing for years. She lauds
the increased provisions for women’s educa-
tion, unveiling, and admittance of women into
Tehran University as some of Reza Shah’s most
significant reforms (91–104).
The chapter titled “Troubled Times” dis-
cusses setbacks to the cause of women’s rights
because of a loss of royal patronage: “After
September 1941, when the women’s move-
ment unexpectedly lost the support of the great
royal patron who had done so much for their
freedom and happiness, reactionary elements
on every side seized the opportunity to start ag-
itating and causing trouble” (106). The state is
seen as a bulwark of protection and rationality
against ever-looming reactionary forces with the
power to instigate mass opposition. This power
stems from the “simple-minded and excitable”
nature of the masses who are easily led astray
by their ignorance and irrationality (119). But
since women during Reza Shah’s reign had
“tasted freedom,” they resisted the attempts of
“agitators” at reversing women’s rights. The ac-
tivities of these enlightened women “had some
effect in preventing a setback in the condition
of the great mass of women in old-fashioned
families” (107). In Bamdad’s narrative, too, “en-
lightened” (i.e., upper-class) women act as the
vanguards and protectors of helpless traditional
(i.e., lower-class) women.
Bamdad is careful to distinguish between
traditional reactionary elements and the reli-
gion of Islam. Any opposition to women’s rights
is traditional and thus reactionary, because of
the inherent opposition of tradition in relation
to modernity, which comes to stand in for social
modernization and economic development in
her narrative. But, she argues, reaction is not
the same as religion, since “true” Islam is com-
patible with the enlightened goals of moder-
nity/modernization. Religious opposition is re-
actionary because it espouses a form of Islam
corrupted by tradition: “While adversaries of
women’s advancement all too often invoke reli-
gion in support of their attitudes, scholars who
have made profound studies of the subject are
convinced that the laws of Islam, if properly un-
derstood and enforced, provide the best assur-
ance of the good life and guarantee women’s
legitimate rights” (111). Bamdad thus posits
women’s rights as intrinsic to Islam, and the past
conditions of women and the clerical opposi-
tion to women’s rights are understood as the re-
sult of distorted notions of Islam and a corrupt
and backward clergy and society.
But the nationalist agenda of moderniza-
tion was predicated on modernized patriarchy
rather than on gender equality. While Bam-
dad’s feminism is based on the rights of the
individual as espoused in the UN Declaration
68. Bamdad’s activities were not always in coopera-
tion with the state. While she gladly took advantage
of the state’s initiative to open Tehran University to
women, in later years her newspaper, Today’sWomen
(Zan-i Imruz), was often banned by state authorities
(Bamdad, From Darkness into Light, 106; and Dolat-



















2 4 1of Human Rights, expressed in the national-
ist context, rights are contingent on the self-
less fulfillment of duties and responsibilities to
the nation (124–25). Ideally, in the nationalist
context, an educated woman uses her emanci-
pation to serve and obey nationalist preroga-
tives, which are designed for the good of the
greater community.69 Bamdad repeatedly em-
phasizes the need for education and modern-
ization for the benefit of the nation, not because
women are important as individuals but be-
cause it makes them better wives and mothers.70
This compromise and contingency of rights re-
flects a version of modernity still firmly en-
sconced in patriarchal relations. If the primary
reason women should be given rights is for
them to be better wives and mothers, a woman’s
position is largely determined by her relation
to men. Therefore individual rights are being
sought, but they are procured through compro-
mise with and subordination to the duties of a
patriarchal nationalist discourse, which allows
for the appropriation of women’s rights into the
practices of domination.
Women gain their very subjecthood ac-
cording to their perceived level of moderniza-
tion according to the nationalist ideal. Bamdad
describes women’s legal right to vote and run
for office as “the proclamation of the equality of
men’s and women’s rights.” Aside from the fact
that this political right was not accompanied by
attendant social and economic rights, the ma-
jority of women were not “modern” enough to
claim this right of citizenship, since “the major-
ity of the nation’s women had been trammeled
by their upbringing with outworn ideas and no-
tions.” What was now needed was a complete
transformation of behavior and thought, from a
traditional trajectory to a modern one: “Now it
was necessary to inform them [women] of their
rights which they had acquired and of the duties
which would henceforth fall on them, and gen-
erally to prepare them for enjoyment of free-
dom and recognition of its limits.”71 An under-
standing of freedom is contingent on a grasp of
its limits. According to Bamdad, it is the job of
the activists who had fought for these rights to
inculcate their meaning and attendant respon-
sibilities in the population that they supposedly
represented.72
Not only does Bamdad’s concept of rights
and duties establish a problematic power re-
lation, it also implies a different set of rights
for women according to the degree of their
modernization, which fell largely across class
lines. As Partha Chatterjee has commented,
“The story of nationalist emancipation is nec-
essarily a story of betrayal. Because it could con-
fer freedom only by imposing at the same time
a whole new set of controls, it could define a
cultural identity for the nation only by exclud-
ing many from its fold; and it could grant the
dignity of citizenship to some only because the
others always needed to be represented and
could not be allowed to speak for themselves.”73
The emancipation of women in Iran was the
emancipation of a select group of women, along
class lines; it was an emancipation gained ac-
cording to a distinction from and at the ex-
pense of lower-class women. Activists were set in
a position of power over lower-class women and
charged with the task of “humanizing” them by
subjecting their minds and bodies to a process
of modernization. This task marginalized the
rights and power of lower-class women within
state-sponsored women’s rights discourse, just
as the feminist discourse of gender equality was
marginalized through activists’ negotiation with
the state’s modernization discourse.
69. Dipesh Chakrabarty also discusses the national-
ist ideal of selflessness in the Indian context, which
is relevant to the Iranian case: “This model of the
‘modern’ Bengali/Indian woman—educated enough
to appreciate the modern regulations of the body
and the state but yet ‘modest’ enough to be un-
selfassertive and unselfish—was tied to debates on
‘freedom.’ ‘Freedom’ in the West, several authors ar-
gued, meant jathechhachar, to do as one pleased,
the right to self-indulgence. In India, it was said, free-
dom meant freedom from the ego, the capacity to
serve and obey voluntarily” (“Postcoloniality and the
Artifice of History: Who Speaks for ‘Indian’ Pasts?”
Representations 37 [1992]: 14).
70. Bamdad, FromDarkness into Light, 25, 55–66, 126–
27.
71. Ibid., 121.
72. This is an old impulse. According to Afsaneh
Najmabadi, from the mid-nineteenth century, the
traditional woman was the most prominent sym-
bol of backwardness: “Correspondingly the journey
into modernity was defined as one of educating
and unveiling this backward subject” (“Hazards of
Modernity and Morality: Women, State, and Ideol-
ogy in Contemporary Iran,” inWomen, Islam, and the
State, ed. Deniz Kandiyoti [Philadelphia: Temple Uni-
versity Press, 1991], 51).




















The Price of Cooperation:
Compromising the Rights of Lower-Class Women
Social transformation, from a traditional exis-
tence to a modernized one, was a necessary part
of activists’ projects for women. This contention
between the need for unity of identity (we, the
women of Iran) and the need to recognize dif-
ference within that identity (we, on behalf of
the women of Iran) is a discursive paradox of
women’s rights activism inscribed within a mod-
ernizing agenda. This paradox created a spe-
cific power relation that indicates how a dis-
course of gender equality can come to practice
a relation of domination.
Mehrangiz Dolatshahi’s description of the
New Path’s activism in southern Tehran pro-
vides an example of a lower-class urban context.
The organization opened a social services cen-
ter, which provided a variety of classes for poor,
illiterate women, including classes on health
and hygiene, child rearing, cooking, sewing,
and literacy. These classes were designed to in-
still “modern, scientific” methods of domestic-
ity, personal hygiene, child rearing, and enough
literacy for women to function in a modern so-
ciety. Dolatshahi describes the nature of these
classes and the teaching methods used:
For instance, we would teach them to get their
child’s birth certificate at the right time, not
when they wanted to put the child in school and
then they don’t have the birth certificate and
come to us for help, or to keep their houses
clean. We would give these kinds of assistance
and offer prizes. For instance, we would teach
the women, don’t leave your trash in front of the
door to your house, clean your house, wash your
windows, don’t dip your dirty toilet implements
[aftabih] in the courtyard pool [hawz] and then
when the women would do these things, [the
New Path activists] would say, good, because you
have learned these things so well now we will
give you a prize [jayzih], we will buy your child
clothes or get something for you.74
This narrative implies that women did not know
how to cook, clean, or take care of their chil-
dren before their encounter with the New Path,
because their methods were not modern and
therefore did not register as methods at all.
From this point of view, tradition is equated with
irrationality, disorder, filth, and ignorance and
therefore cannot be identified as something sys-
tematic. This condescending assumption is re-
flected in the strategy by which “proper,” mod-
ern methods were taught. This strategy, the
reward system, is one of overt instruction, rem-
iniscent of the unsubtle training children re-
ceive. By infantalizing other women, activists as-
sume the role of amother beholden to the state,
a dominating role similar to that of a father.
Lower-class urban women were not in-
cluded in the New Path’s debates over their so-
cial service policies; rather, these women were
to be acted on. Dolatshahi’s description of
their needs is telling of how this interpretation
shaped the nature of middle-class women’s ac-
tivism toward poor urban women. For middle-
class women, charity work prepares them for
involvement in civic activities. But for poor
women, they are to learn how to keep their
houses clean and to cook better so that their
husbands will stop beating them.75 The nature
of activism and the rights women are entitled
to in lived experience appear to change with
respect to activists’ perceived distinctions in
women’s levels of modernization and their con-
comitant class positions.
The proceedings of a 1975 WOI-spon-
sored international conference on functional
literacy, “The Design of Educational Pro-
grammes for the Social and Economic Pro-
motion of Rural Women,”76 provide a view
of women’s rights activism in a rural lower-
class context. The shared concept of the con-
tingency of rights and duties, according to
perceived degrees of modernization, provided
a common ideological grammar that high-
lights the inherent harmony among the mod-
ernization policies of international organiza-
tions, the Iranian state, and the WOI. In other
words, modernization discourse lent itself to
a relation of domination in various contexts,
whether as part of an internationalist discourse,
a nationalist discourse, or a discourse of gen-
der equality. Activists from different countries
formed a community based on their position
74. Dolatshahi, tape 3, 23–24.
75. Dolatshahi, tape 4, 1.
76. The conferencewas presented in honor of the UN-



















2 4 3as “modern” upper-class women engaged in dis-
cussions about how to modernize largely illit-
erate, rural, lower-class women. The activists’
view was that through a specific form of lit-
eracy, called functional literacy, these tradi-
tional beings would become active citizens in
the social and economic life of the modern
nation-state. In her opening remarks at the
conference, Ashraf Pahlavi states that “the liter-
acy program will transform the submissive and
passive into beings of a new type—into beings
able to share the sufferings and difficulties of
others, who will develop a critical conscious-
ness and know how to pose problems objec-
tively, who will find fulfillment in constructive
work and who will, above all, be receptive to
others.”77 Rural women are represented as sub-
missive and passive beings, incapable of ratio-
nal thought, engaged inmeaningless work, with
an almost subhuman emotional consciousness.
In these discussions of rural lower-class women,
feminism constitutes itself along class lines, mir-
roring international norms of socioeconomic
modernization.78
Afkhami’s conference speech provides an
interesting contrast to her article written af-
ter the Anti-Shah Revolution. Here we see the
limits imposed on her speech by her posi-
tion within the state. “The issues to be dis-
cussed in this seminar are matters which bear
upon individual dignity, social justice, and na-
tional progress.”79 Her statement distinguishes
individual dignity from society and the na-
tion, an acknowledgment entirely absent from
Pahlavi’s speech. But Afkhami’s acknowledg-
ment has limits. Afkhami attempts to present
rural women as active participants in their own
modernization, to show that this process is vol-
untary. She states that the project “would suc-
ceed only to the degree that we engage the
women of Saveh as full partners in a common
endeavor” (5). However, the program’s actual
design shows cooperation as a secondary con-
sideration at best. For instance, out of nineteen
issues, rural women in the Saveh district listed
family planning ninth in importance. How-
ever, the program spends three out of eighteen
weeks on family planning. The WOI justified
the amount of time allocated to family planning
by pointing to social indicators such as high
pregnancy and birth rates, early marriage, and
high infantmortality rates (33). TheWOI’s con-
centration on family planning reflects state con-
cerns: the state is interested in population con-
trol, since pregnant women and women with
many children are less likely to be economically
active, in the sense of wage labor. According
to this reasoning, rural women don’t know any
better, and the experts overrule their requests.
Though Afkhami insists, “In sum, the Project
is not something which the Women’s Organiza-
tion has done for, or to, the women of Saveh, but
a programme which we have carried through to-
gether” (6), statements like this must have rung
hollow to the rural women involved in the pro-
gram.
Conclusion
This cross section of narratives, of individual ex-
periences and perspectives, is far from repre-
sentative of all women’s rights activists within
the state. Instead, it indicates trends that help
us find new ways to explore old questions. With
this in mind, “without impugning the courage
and vision of upper- and middle-class women
who were literate and educated . . . we can still
consider the contradictions their class positions
put them in vis-a`-vis other women.”80 Writing
a critical history of women’s rights activism in
an autocratic context is contingent on preserv-
ing the agency of upper-class activists. With-
out this agency, we participate in erasure of
history by speaking for activists rather than
analyzing their discourse, and thereby rein-
scribe a relation of dominance. While Lila Abu-
Lughod warns us “not to accept uncritically the
terms of the upper- and middle-class women in-
volved in most feminist projects—the notions
77. The Women’s Organization of Iran and the Inter-
national Institute for Adult LiteracyMethods, The De-
sign of Educational Programmes for the Social and
Economic Promotion of Rural Women: An Interna-
tional Seminar 19–24 April 1975 (Tehran: Women’s
Organization of Iran, 1975), 3.
78. For an account of how activists found coopera-
tion and commonality at the international level with
women of similar ideological and class orientations,
see Dolatshahi, tape 4, 19–20.
79. Women’s Organization of Iran and International
Institute for Adult Literacy Methods, Design of Edu-
cational Programmes, 4.
80. Lila Abu-Lughod, “Feminist Longings and Post-
colonial Conditions,” in RemakingWomen: Feminism
and Modernity in the Middle East, ed. Lila Abu-





















of ‘awakening,’ ‘women’s rights,’ and ‘empow-
erment’ that are part of the narratives of
progress and enlightenment,”81 doing exactly
that helps us locate paradoxes surrounding
these notions within their own words, through
their own agency.
The conceptual bind between gender
equality in feminist discourse and modernized
patriarchy in modernization discourse created
an elitist form of women’s rights activism in
Iran. The induction of activism into the state’s
modernization framework not only circum-
scribed the ability of activists to procure rights
but also ensconced activists in a paternalizing
intragender dominance with respect to lower-
class women. Activists adopted modernization
discourse’s hierarchies of exclusion and dom-
ination, which limited their ability to substan-
tially alter patriarchal relations. According to
Teresa de Lauretis, the feminist subject is “not
unified or simply divided between positions of
masculinity and femininity, but multiply orga-
nized across positionalities along several axes
and across mutually contradictory discourses
and practices.” Race, class, nation, and sexuality
constitute these other axes, creating the femi-
nist subject as “much less pure, as indeed ideo-
logically complicitous with ‘the oppressor.’”82
By dehumanizing lower-class women, ac-
tivists were able to inscribe their reforms within
the nationalist agenda of modernization. This
complicity haunted them, since it also entailed
accepting the limits of modern patriarchy on
these reforms. Activists fighting for reform of
family laws were trying to reform traditional
patriarchal relations, which in turn codified
and strengthened the modern patriarchy es-
poused by the state. As a result, class divides
were reproduced and reinforced, and a whole
stratum of lower-class women, labeled as tra-
ditional, was alienated. Articulations of class,
gender, and nation are indeed “relationally im-
plicated in one another,”83 and these relations
manifest themselves in power negotiations. At
stake in analyzing these negotiations is a con-
cept of agency that informs relations of power as
fluid and multiple and that comprises spaces of
resistance.
81. Ibid., 25.
82. Teresa de Lauretis, “Displacing Hegemonic Dis-
courses: Reflections on Feminist Theory in the
1980’s,” Inscriptions 3–4 (1988): 136.
83. Sinha, “Gender in the Critiques of Colonialism and
Nationalism,” 498.
